Does hedging add value to the firm, and if so, is the source of the added value consistent with hedging theory? We investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the US airline industry during 1994-2000 to examine whether such hedging is a source of value for these companies. We illustrate that the investment climate in the airline industry conforms well to the theoretic framework of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) . In general, airline industry investment opportunities correlate positively with jet fuel costs, while higher fuel costs are consistent with lower cash flow. Given that jet fuel costs are hedgeable, airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging future purchases of jet fuel. Our results show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. The coefficients on the hedging indicator variables in our regression analysis suggest that the "hedging premium" constitutes approximately a 12-16 percent increase in firm value. We find that the positive relation between hedging and value increases in capital investment. This result is consistent with the assertion that the principal benefit of jet fuel hedging by airlines comes from reduction of underinvestment costs. 
I. Introduction
Recent literature in corporate finance has fostered an improved understanding of why nonfinancial firms may hedge. 1 However, very little research has focused on whether hedging achieves reasonable economic objectives. In particular, many researchers are interested in whether hedging increases firm value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the relation between foreign currency hedging and Tobin's Q. They conclude that hedging is associated with higher firm value.
1 Allayannis and Ofek (2001) , Berkman and Bradbury (1996) , Dolde (1995) , Gay and Nam (1998) , Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) , Graham and Rogers (2002) , Haushalter (2000) , Mian (1996) , Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) , Rogers (2002) , Schrand and Unal (1998), and Tufano (1996) are many of the published studies examining the determinants of corporate hedging behavior.
One obvious question resulting from the results of Allayannis and Weston (2001) pertains to the source of value from hedging. They speculate that the source of added value from hedging is likely attributable to its ability to reduce underinvestment as theorized by Bessembinder (1991) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) . Unfortunately, their study is unable to draw this specific conclusion.
In this paper, we study the dual questions of "does hedging add value?" and "if so, what is the source of added value?" To do so, we identify a more targeted sample than used by Allayannis and Weston (2001) . We analyze hedging of jet fuel price risk exposure by US airlines. Because average jet fuel costs constitute approximately 13 percent, on average, of airlines' operating costs, jet fuel price risk is economically meaningful to airlines.
In addressing the value question, we adopt a similar framework to Allayannis and Weston (2001) . The results show that airlines increase value by hedging their jet fuel price exposures.
Additionally, changes in hedging are positively associated with changes in firm value. As in Allayannis and Weston, we interpret certain results from our regressions as the "hedging premium" (i.e., the added firm value attributable to hedging). Our results suggest that the average hedging premium for airlines is in the range of 12-16 percent.
The airline sample allows us to also address the source of value question. We find that the airline industry exhibits two characteristics consistent with the general assumptions and framework developed in Froot et al. (1993) . First, the airline industry's history of investment spending is not negatively correlated with jet fuel costs, as one might expect. In fact, the relation between these two variables is largely positive. Second, airlines face significant distress costs, as shown by Pulvino (1998 Pulvino ( , 1999 , because distressed airlines are forced to sell aircraft at belowmarket prices. Froot et al. (1993) suggest that firms facing significant expected distress costs will choose to underinvest. In essence, the underinvestment cost is an indirect cost of financial distress (e.g., Stulz (1996) ). They show that hedging is a mechanism to alleviate this underinvestment incentive. In their model, hedging is more valuable when investment opportunities display lower correlations with cash flows from hedgeable risks. Thus, rather than assuming that underinvestment reduction is the reason that hedging adds value (as is done by Allayannis and Weston), our sample industry is chosen because it "fits" the theory. Given this, an additional contribution of our study is to illustrate the source of economic benefits of hedging in an industry environment where investment opportunities may be positively correlated with a hedgeable risk.
Given investment patterns in the airline industry, the value premium suggests that hedging allows airlines more ability to fund investment during periods of high jet fuel prices.
The positive relation between hedging and value suggests that investors view such investment as positive net present value projects. We find that the interaction of hedging and capital expenditures captures at least 72 percent of the hedging premium. We also examine a two-stage system in which hedging impacts value through its effect on capital expenditures. While the system shows no statistically significant effect of hedging on capital expenditures, the economic impact of hedging on value suggests that, if a hedging premium exists, it results largely from the effect of hedging on capital investment.
An additional rationale for our choice of studying hedging in the airline industry is that the firms face substantial price risk associated with jet fuel price volatility. Guay and Kothari (2003) suggest that most sample firms used in many prior studies defining hedging using interest rate and/or currency derivatives may be unable to gain significant benefits from their derivative holdings. We note that jet fuel prices are more volatile than prices of other underlying assets typically studied, particularly currencies. Annualized jet fuel price volatility measured from monthly averages over 1994-2000 is approximately 26 percent. As a point of comparison, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that the annualized volatility of major currencies is only 11 percent (measured over 1988-1997) . Additionally, using the median percentage of fuel consumption hedged, we show that the cash flow sensitivity to extreme jet fuel price changes (defined similarly to the measure calculated by Guay and Kothari) of the median firm in our sample is 21.6 percent of capital expenditures. Overall, airline exposure to jet fuel price risk is economically significant, and considerable cash would be realized by hedging airlines in the event of an extreme price increase.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief review of relevant hedging literature. Section III investigates investment and financing patterns in the US airline industry.
Section IV presents data on the magnitude of jet fuel costs and jet fuel hedging by the sample of airlines. Economic exposure to fuel price risk for US airline firms is also examined in Section IV. The value of hedging is analyzed in Section V, and we investigate whether the hedging premium is associated with the investment opportunities framework. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Literature Review

A. General Overview
Much of the theoretical research in corporate risk management identifies valuemaximizing rationales for hedging.
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Empirical research in this area primarily focuses on identifying the rationales that are associated with corporate hedging behavior. For example, many published articles conclude that firms hedge to reduce expected costs of distress.
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Other 2 These articles include Bessembinder (1991) , Froot et al. (1993) , Mello and Parsons (2000) , and Smith and Stulz (1985) .
3 Berkman and Bradbury (1996) , Dolde (1995) , Gay and Nam (1998) , Graham and Rogers (2002) , Haushalter (2000) , and Howton and Perfect (1998) are examples of papers reaching this conclusion.
papers deduce that firms hedge because of high investment opportunities. 4 While empirical research in hedging has identified rationales that drive corporate derivatives usage, there is little evidence to date that these financial policies assist in value creation. Two recent studies make attempts to address this shortcoming. Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the effect of currency derivatives usage on relative market value (as defined by Tobin's Q). They find a positive relation between currency hedging and Tobin's Q, and interpret this as evidence that hedging improves firm value. Graham and Rogers (2002) test the effect of derivatives hedging on debt in a capital structure model. They find that hedging has a positive effect on debt ratios. They measure the incremental tax benefits of the additional debt due to derivatives hedging, and show that the average hedging firm achieves gross tax benefits of approximately $30 million.
This paper seeks to provide additional evidence on the market value impact of hedging policy. Our aim is to identify the value effect of a single hedging policy in an investment and financing environment where hedging should be valued as in the theoretic framework discussed by Froot et al. (1993) . We discuss their setting in more detail next. Investment, Financing, Cash Flow, and Hedging Froot et al. (1993) illustrate the value of hedging for firms facing financial constraints.
B.
Their basic framework shows that, when the costs of external capital include deadweight costs, firms requiring outside financing will underinvest when internal cash flow is sufficiently low.
Hedging generates additional cash in these states, thus circumventing the underinvestment problem.
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An important feature of the Froot et al. (1993) et al. (1993) model, hedging may allow managers to destroy value. Tufano's framework assumes that managers are able to appropriate an amount in excess of the value created from an investment project. External capital providers know this agency problem exists, and therefore, refuse to provide capital for this project. Managers may hedge to avoid the inability to invest in the "pet" project after low cash flow realizations.
One of the testable implications of the Froot et al. model is that investment-cash flow sensitivity should be declining with hedging. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2000) show that investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower for firms that hedge with foreign currency derivatives.
This result is consistent with Froot et al. (1993) , suggesting that firms hedge to ensure sufficient amounts of cash to take advantage of valuable investment opportunities during periods of unfavorable cash flow shocks. Alternatively, their results may be consistent with Tufano (1998).
Hedgers may be insulating investment from the scrutiny of outside investors so managers can obtain private benefits from "pet" projects. Adam (2002) studies the implications of Froot et al. (1993) in a sample of North American gold mining firms. He provides evidence suggesting that firms with higher expected investment hedge a greater degree of expected investment. Furthermore, he documents that the positive relation between investment and external financing is smaller for hedging firms. He interprets the combination of results as indirect evidence consistent with Froot et al. (1993) .
Nevertheless, Adam does not examine the value implications of hedging, so his results may also be consistent with Tufano (1998).
We show in the next section that the US airline industry provides a natural industrial setting to examine hedging in the context of the Froot et al. (1993) framework. Ultimately, our goal is to address whether hedging allows airlines to increase value. We test this hypothesis in Section V.
C. What About Other Hedging Rationales?
We motivate this study by illustrating the applicability of the airline industry environment to the underinvestment rationale for hedging. However, several rationales exist for increased value from hedging beyond the Froot et al. (1993) study. We discuss the potential applicability of these rationales below, and argue that other value-increasing reasons for hedging do not fit the airline data particularly well. First, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that reducing the volatility of taxable income generates greater firm value if the firm faces a convex tax function. Graham and Smith (1999) 6 Because we are interested in value effects, we do not consider managerial motives as a hedging motive (e.g., Tufano (1996)) because there is not a clear link that hedging for such reasons has a positive value effect.
illustrate the economic magnitude of the tax savings available from hedging as a result of estimated tax function convexity. However, Graham and Rogers (2002) find that such tax savings have no power to explain hedging behavior by a large cross-section of firms. We examine whether tax function convexity may explain hedging in the airline industry by constructing Smith's (1999, p. 2256) predicted convexity variable for each sample airline exhibiting a non-trivial jet fuel hedging policy. Of these 13 active jet fuel hedgers, the Graham and Smith regression predicts tax savings (as a percentage of taxable income) in excess of 2.5 percent for five firms (Airtran, America West, Amtran, Hawaiian, and Northwest) as of year-end 2000. However, the two largest hedgers in the sample (Delta and Southwest) display the lowest predicted convexities. In fact, Southwest is predicted to have an effectively concave tax function. We also multiply the predicted convexity values by taxable income to find the implied dollar amount of tax savings from reducing volatility. As a percentage of equity market value, the median firm's tax benefit as a percentage of equity market value is only 0.08 percent, and the maximum tax benefit is only 0.47 percent. Overall, the economic benefit of hedging to take advantage of tax function convexity appears limited. Stulz (1996) provides discussion highlighting the fact that the underinvestment costs outlined in Froot et al. (1993) is an important indirect cost of financial distress. Alternatively, direct costs of financial distress may be an important element in the hedging decision. As an example of bankruptcy costs in the airline industry, Weiss and Wruck (1998) Another source of value from hedging is related to reduction of distress probability. Leland (1998) argues that firms capable of significantly reducing distress probability by hedging would increase financial leverage upon hedging to achieve additional tax benefits. Graham and Rogers (2002) find that this strategy yields significant economic benefits for a number of hedging firms. If airlines follow such a strategy, we should observe increases in leverage by hedging firms in recent years as jet fuel hedging has become more pervasive. However, hedging airlines have typically decreased debt levels during the study's time frame.
The discussion above suggests that the benefits of hedging from tax convexity, expected direct bankruptcy costs, and increases in debt tax shields would be small for airlines over the time frame studied. Given that we find a hedging premium of 12-16 percent in our analysis, it seems the hedging rationales discussed above are relatively unimportant for airlines. Thus, we focus our attention on explaining why the airline industry fits the framework of the underinvestment rationale for hedging as presented by Froot et al. (1993) .
III. Investment, Jet Fuel Costs, Cash Flow and Financing in the Airline Industry
A. Relation of Investment, Jet Fuel Costs and Cash Flow
There are two major ways in which hedging can assist in an airline's ability to invest.
First, new aircraft purchases must be planned years in advance, and purchase orders submitted to the aircraft manufacturer. Purchase orders are disclosed as firm commitments in the financial statement footnotes; however, the orders appear to include deferral/cancellation options as most carriers recently exercised such options following the World Trade Center attacks. Hedging preserves internal cash flow to meet future commitments to purchase aircraft.
Second, periods of economic downturn often result in failure and/or asset sales by financially weak airlines. Financially stronger airlines may be in a position to buy these assets at prices below fair value (e.g., Pulvino, 1998 Pulvino, , 1999 . Investment may also take the form of acquisition of a financially weak carrier. Kim and Singal (1993) show that such acquisitions typically yield higher fare environments upon completion of the acquisition. If hedging improves its cash position during economic downturns, the hedged airline may rely less (or not at all) on external sources of funds to make such capital expenditures (e.g., Froot et al., 1993 To analyze whether the airline industry is characterized by the investment and financing environment discussed in Froot et al. (1993) , we examine aggregate airline industry data on jet fuel costs, investment expenditures, and cash flow from 1979-2000. All airlines with at least $100 million in assets in the Compustat active and research databases are included in the aggregate statistics for investment expenditures and cash flows. The Froot et al. (1993) framework implies the higher the correlation between jet fuel costs and investment, combined with a negative relation between jet fuel costs and cash flow, the greater the benefit to hedging. The second column of The figure presents the regression line estimated by OLS, and suggests that aggregate airline investment is high during periods of high fuel prices. While statistical significance is only marginal in this regression, the important point is that, in aggregate, airlines do not offset higher fuel costs by lowering capital expenditures. This is one of the key aspects of the Froot et al. (1993) framework. Nevertheless, this presents only one necessary condition for hedging to be useful. Jet fuel costs must be negatively associated with cash flow. 9 Given that airlines must commit to aircraft orders in advance, we examine the relation between investment and cash flow lagged two years. We find that the relation between investment and cash flow lagged two years is positively related (with weak statistical significance over . So, high levels of investment may be indicative of high cash flows at the time when the investment decision is binding. However, this finding does not eliminate the positive relation between investment and jet fuel costs. The level of jet fuel costs remains positively related to investment even when controlling for lagged cash flow (although statistical significance declines slightly).
significance is not strong, the overall basic pattern that emerges is one that is consistent with the Froot et al. (1993) theoretical framework.
The relations above incorporate data from the early 1980's (i.e., as the industry was being deregulated). To address concerns that the results discussed above may be driven by conditions more reminiscent of the early 1980's, we examine the data using only observations from 1987 -2000. The implications of the results using more recent data remain: airline capital expenditures are high during periods of higher fuel costs, even while cash flow is typically lower.
One additional concern is that the relation between jet fuel costs and cash flow may drive the relation between jet fuel costs and investment. To examine this, we perform multivariate regressions of the investment measures on both jet fuel costs and cash flow measures. The positive relation between jet fuel costs and investment, while statistically weakened by the inclusion of cash flow measures in some cases, remains similar to the relations reported earlier.
In fact, the positive coefficient on jet fuel costs is of considerably greater significance than the negative coefficient on cash flow.
B. Costs of Financial Distress and the Airline Financing Environment
An additional extension of the Froot et al. (1993) argument is that external finance is increasingly expensive when the hedgeable risk factor negatively affects cash flows (i.e., when jet fuel costs are high). The source of the additional deadweight cost may be the result of distress costs, information asymmetry, as well as other possible sources. Pulvino (1998) presents evidence that airlines face significant distress costs. He shows that aircraft are often sold in "fire sales" by financially troubled airlines. In this context, Froot et al. (1993) implies that airlines would want to hedge against rising fuel prices if this strategy makes it possible to invest in aircraft (and other assets) of financially distressed airlines at discount prices. Alternatively, airlines may wish to hedge to avoid the possibility of selling assets at below-market values, thus reducing expected financial distress costs (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985) . However, as will be seen in the next section, smaller airlines (which face higher proportional costs of distress) hedge much less than the largest firms in the industry. Thus, the Froot et al. (1993) arguments seem more compelling in explaining airline hedging behavior.
To examine the relative cost of airline debt financing, we gather the S&P ratings for senior debt of the 15 sample airlines with ratings reported in the Compustat database. Table 2 shows the level of credit ratings as of January 1988 ( While jet fuel prices are not the sole source of the cash flow declines mentioned above, it is worth noting that they were relatively high during 1990 as the industry slump began.
Alternatively, as jet fuel prices fell significantly during 1997-1999, airline debt was often upgraded. Eight credit upgrades (over seven airlines) occurred during 1997 and 1998. However, this upgrade activity did not offset much of the downgrades occurring in the early 1990's. These observations imply that airlines face lackluster credit markets. As we have recently seen in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks, external shocks can have devastating impact on the industry's cash flows. Interestingly, the last major cash flow shock of the 1990's occurred during a period when major airlines had better credit ratings. In the current environment, hedging may be much more important to airlines wishing to take advantage of future periods of industry consolidation.
The data presented thus far suggests that firms in the airline industry may have significant investment opportunities when cash flows are low. Furthermore, industry investment has been positively related to the level of jet fuel costs, suggesting that airlines could hedge to preserve cash flow to use for such investment. Hedging may be important in this respect because airlines face significant distress costs, and typically face low credit ratings. In the next section, we present summary data regarding airline cost structures and jet fuel hedging practices over 1994- We do not include other types of transportation firms (such as railroads and trucking companies) because they typically face very different fuel price risk exposures. For example, Banham (2000) notes that railroads are less affected by fuel price increases because diesel cost increases are partially offset by increased revenues from delivering coal (i.e., an alternative fuel source). Airlines typically lack these types of natural hedges. The next set of three columns in Table 3 that the median firm in its sample would generate cash flow amounting to only 9 percent of investing cash flow (capital expenditures are greater than or equal to investing net cash flow for over half of our sample). Clearly, jet fuel hedging by airlines is economically meaningful in terms of Guay and Kothari's measure.
2000.
IV. Airline Fuel Cost Structures, Hedging, and Exposure to Volatile Fuel Prices
A. Airline Fuel Costs and Hedging
An alternative approach to measuring exposure is to estimate the effect of actual changes in jet fuel prices on operating cash flow. To examine this effect for each firm in our sample, we regress the year-over-year changes in quarterly operating income before depreciation (as a percentage of sales) on the changes in quarterly average jet fuel price (in cents per gallon).
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In untabulated results, we find that the median coefficient from the regression above is -0.0013, suggesting that airlines face significant cash flow risk from rising jet fuel prices. A 15-cent increase in jet fuel price (recall the standard deviation of Gulf Coast jet fuel prices was just over 15 cents) implies a decrease of 1.95 percent in cash flow as a percentage of sales. To put this in context, the median airline quarterly cash flow as a percentage of sales is 10.4 percent.
Thus, a roughly one standard deviation increase in jet fuel price corresponds to approximately a 18.75 percent decrease in cash flow margin, on average (i.e., 1.95 ÷ 10.4).
As a final measure of exposure, we estimate a market model that includes a weekly jet fuel return factor. This type of methodology is standard in other research examining risk exposures.
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For each firm-year in our sample, we conduct the following weekly time-series regression:
14 Year-over-year changes in quarterly data are used because of seasonality in airline operating income. The jet fuel prices used are simple averages of the five regional prices presented earlier averaged over the 3 months in each quarter. The data observations are from first quarter of calendar 1995 through the fourth quarter of calendar 2000. 15 Common practice in exposure research (such as measuring currency exposure) is to use percentage change in the independent variable. This approach is appropriate when measuring stock return exposure. However, in this regression, we measure cash flow exposures to jet fuel price changes. A 15-cent price change should have similar cash flow effects on airlines whether jet fuel price is at 40 cents per gallon or 80 cents per gallon.
where R it is the rate of return on the ith company's common stock in week t (as gathered from CRSP), R mt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, R Jt is the percentage change in OPIS jet fuel prices, and ε it is the idiosyncratic error term.
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For each firm, the estimated coefficient, γ i , is a measure of the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to changes in jet fuel prices. We expect airlines to be negatively exposed to the price of jet fuel.
In untabulated results, we find that, on average, airlines' stock prices are negatively related to jet fuel prices, but the effect of short-term fluctuations in fuel prices is economically small (and coefficients are rarely statistically significant). The average jet fuel exposures range from -0.061 using the Gulf Coast jet fuel prices to -0.079 using New York prices.
V. Do Investors Value Jet Fuel Hedging?
A.
Measurement of Firm Value
Thus far, we have shown that airlines have incentives to hedge jet fuel exposures to protect internal cash flow, and that jet fuel cost levels tend to be negatively correlated with industry investment. These conditions suggest that, if the market expects airlines to invest marginal cash flow in positive net present value projects, then investors should place positive value on jet fuel hedging. On the other hand, if investors view such investment unfavorably, hedging would have negative value consequences. The purpose of this section is to examine the relation between airline firm value and jet fuel hedging practices.
We investigate whether airlines' jet fuel hedging activities positively affect value by estimating the empirical relationships between Tobin's Q (our proxy for firm value) and jet fuel hedging. Our approach is similar to the procedure used by Allayannis and Weston (2001) to investigate the relation between firm value and the use of foreign currency derivatives.
We measure firm value using the simple approximation of Tobin's Q, developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) .
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This method offers several advantages: first, the computational cost is low relative to other more complex methods of calculating Tobin's Q. Second, the data are readily available using COMPUSTAT for small, as well as large, firms. Finally, Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Perfect and Wiles (1994) find a high degree of correlation between the simple approximation and more rigorous constructions of Q.
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DaDalt, Donaldson, and Garner (2003) note these three advantages of utilizing a simple construction of Q, and conclude that the simple Q calculation is preferable in most empirical applications. Given the proportion of smaller firms in our sample, the availability of data is an especially important issue.
Because our purpose is to investigate the link between jet fuel hedging and value, we require variables to measure such hedging by airlines. In Section 4, we discuss ways by which airlines manage fuel price risk: hedging with derivatives, entering into fuel pass-through agreements, and passing fuel cost changes along to charter customers. We form dummy variables indicating each type of fuel price risk management and a dummy indicating usage of any of the 18 The Q ratio is calculated as the following sum divided by book value of total assets: (market value of equity + liquidation value of preferred stock + the book values of long-term debt and current liabilities -current assets + book value of inventory). We use Compustat to obtain the accounting data for our control variables, as well as to calculate Tobin's Q. We use Moody's Industrial Manual to obtain the yields on preferred stock for medium-grade industrials.
19 Perfect and Wiles (1994) find that regression results using the simple approximation may differ from more complex estimations of Tobin's Q. However, when estimating relationships using changes in values, the simple approximation produces similar results to the other calculations of Q. We conduct tests using both value levels and changes.
three types. However, in subsequent regression analysis, only hedging with derivatives shows any explanatory power, so we limit our analysis to this type of variable.
We measure jet fuel hedging with derivatives in three ways. First, we define a hedging dummy if the airline discloses any use of derivatives to hedge jet fuel exposure, even if no other information is given. Second, for most of our data, firms disclose the percentage of its coming year's jet fuel requirements that it has hedged as of year-end. Finally, we define a dummy variable that is equal to one if the percentage hedged is greater than zero.
Our sample consists of 26 airlines over a maximum period of 1994 -2000 with a total of 164 firm-year observations of Tobin's Q. Table 4 shows summary values of Q for each firm in the sample. The data are separated into major versus smaller carriers. The first two columns show Q-ratios calculated using the Chung and Pruitt (1994) approach. The second set of Q-ratios is adjusted to reflect the amount of obligations existing under operating leases. Because airlines often lease a significant portion of their aircraft, reported assets may be well below assets actually controlled by the airlines. The adjustment process used is explained in Damodaran (2002) , and is used to find the present value of future operating lease obligations. This present value is then added to assets and debt, thus adjusting the value of Q. Table 4 , Panel A, shows that most airline Q-ratios are well below 1.0. This is true for both major airlines, as well as other carriers. However, Q does display significant variation across airlines and time. Eleven of the 26 airlines have average Q-ratios greater than 1.0 over 1994-2000. However, only two of these observations are from major airlines.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that average Q-ratios vary considerably over the sample period, especially for non-major airlines. In general, the data show no clear time trend, however, the Qratios of major airlines are more skewed in the last three years of the sample. The adjusted Qratios exhibit less skewness because the adjustment process tends to push the values toward one.
B. Control Variables
Other factors, in addition to hedging, affect firm value. To control for these other effects, we include proxy variables to account for the following factors. In general, we structure the control variables to be consistent with those in the regression analysis of Allayannis and Weston (2001) .
Size: Several prior studies find that large firms are more likely to use derivatives due to the high start-up costs necessary to develop a hedging program (see Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996; and Géczy et al., 1997) . This effect is apparent in our sample as well (see Table 3 ). Thus, a positive effect between hedging and value may be due to a positive relation between size and value. For this reason, we include the natural logarithm of total assets to control for the effect of size. Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a negative relation between size and value in their sample.
Dividends: Following Allayannis and Weston (2001), we include a dummy variable if the
firm paid a common dividend during the current year. Firms paying dividends are less likely to be capital constrained (e.g., see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988) and thus may overinvest by accepting negative net present value projects. On the other hand, dividends may be seen as a positive signal from management (especially in an industry that has experienced a significant number of bankruptcy filings). Additionally, the initiation or increase (elimination/reduction) of a dividend is likely to be seen as positive (negative) by the market. Allayannis and Weston (2001) show contrasting evidence on the relation between dividend payment and firm value.
Leverage: Capital structure may affect firm value as well as the firm's decision to hedge if a higher level of debt, and hence, a higher probability of financial distress, induces the firm to hedge (e.g., Haushalter, 2000; and Graham and Rogers, 2002) . We use the ratio of long-term debt to total assets as a control for leverage. Leverage has an ambiguous effect on firm value in Allayannis and Weston (2001 Table 5 presents the results for the estimation of the effect of jet fuel hedging on airline firm value. As in Allayannis and Weston (2001) , the natural logarithm of Q is the dependent variable. By using the natural logarithm of Q, we can interpret coefficients on hedging dummy variables as the hedging premium. Models 1 through 3 are estimated using pooled OLS with robust standard errors, while Models 4 through 6 are estimated using a time-series crosssectional GLS procedure with a heteroskedastically consistent covariance matrix.
C. Results -Firm Value and Hedging
The results for the regressions yield several interesting results. First, the estimates for size are always negative and highly significant, indicating that larger size in the airline industry does not convey an advantage, with respect to firm value. This result is consistent with those in Allayannis and Weston (2001) . Second, the parameter estimates for the dividend dummy variable are positive and significant in all models. In contrast, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that firms with foreign sales show a negative relation between the dividend dummy and firm value, while firms with zero foreign sales show a positive relation between the two. Our results suggest that airlines use dividends to signal their financial success.
We find relatively strong support for the role of hedging as a factor in firm value.
Hedging jet fuel exposure with derivatives shows positive and statistically significant relations with airline firm value using all three measures of jet fuel hedging. The results are similar if we use the adjusted Q-ratios discussed earlier, but we do not report these for the sake of brevity.
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While statistical significance provides confidence that a value premium exists, we are equally (if not more) interested in the economic significance of the relation between hedging and value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) suggest that firms with positive foreign sales command close to a 5 percent premium for hedging currency risk. Our parameter estimates on the hedging dummy variables suggest that airlines hedging jet fuel demand a value premium in the range of 14.94 -16.08 percent. When using the percentage hedged, the coefficient represents the average premium implied if an airline were to hedge 100 percent of its following year fuel requirements.
Given an average hedging percentage of 19 percent, the corresponding premium is approximately 9 percent (0.4745 x 0.19). The magnitude of the jet fuel hedging premium relative 20 The regressions shown in Tables 5 and 6 are also conducted using fixed effects. The Table 5 (level of Q) models show evidence that the firm-specific effects are significant. However, firm-specific effects are not found in the change in Q (Table 6 ) models. Performing fixed effects detracts considerably from the statistical significance of all variables except ROA and percent hedged. Specifically, the percent hedged variable shows significance at the 10% level in the fixed effects models.
to the 5 percent currency hedging premium found by Allayannis and Weston may be due to their inclusion of many firms with relatively small foreign exchange exposures. Our study focuses solely on companies that spend a significant amount of money on jet fuel, thus are more likely to face larger value consequences when choosing whether or not to manage this risk.
An alternative means to measure the value consequences of hedging is to measure the change in value when firms change hedging policy. In fact, this type of regression is less likely to suffer from endogeneity that may call the Table 5 results into question. Table 6 shows the results of regressions examining the changes in firm value (i.e., changes in the natural logarithm of Q) versus the changes in the independent variables.
The addition of a hedging program using derivatives is positively related to firm value.
Specifically, the dummy variable indicating a change from no hedging to a material amount of hedging shows a positively and statistically significant association with change in firm value.
The coefficient on this variable may also be viewed as a hedging premium and the size of these coefficients, while slightly smaller than those shown in Table 5 , are of similar magnitude. The evidence here suggests hedgers are 12.33 -13.68 percent more valuable as a result of initiation of measurable jet fuel hedging. On the other hand, the market appears to place less value on changes in the extent of hedging. The coefficients on the changes in percentage hedged are positive but not statistically significant.
D. Is the Hedging Premium Related to Investment Opportunities?
Earlier in the paper, we postulate that the benefit from jet fuel hedging is primarily related to the reduction of underinvestment as theorized by Froot et al. (1993) . The analysis presented in the prior section establishes a positive relation between hedging and firm value.
However, the prior analyses do not show a link between fuel hedging by airlines and their investment opportunities. In this section, we discuss results of analyses designed to ascertain whether such a rationale explains the hedging premium.
As an initial test, Table 7 shows the results of two regression models that are comparable to Models 3 and 6 from Table 5 . The only difference is the inclusion of an additional independent variable measuring the interaction of hedging with capital expenditures. The variable is computed as the product of the hedging indicator and the capital expenditures-to-sales ratio. In these specifications, the hedging dummy variable shows no significant relation with firm value, while a positive relation is evident on the interaction of capital expenditures and hedging.
Given the binary specification of hedging, the positive relation may be interpreted as follows: for hedgers, an increase in capital spending creates more value, all else equal. Using the coefficients from Model 1 of The theoretic framework for our empirical study suggests the following link (e.g., Bessembinder (1991) and Froot et al. (1993) To model this framework, we estimate capital expenditures as an instrumental variable from the other independent variables shown in the analysis presented in Table 5 . We also add cash flowto-sales, lagged Q, and lagged hedging variables to the capital expenditures specification.
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The fitted values from the first-stage capital expenditures estimation are then utilized in the secondstage estimation of Q. Géczy et al. (1997) and Graham and Rogers (2002) model hedging and leverage as simultaneous decisions. Tufano (1996) notes that executive compensation and hedging decisions are made simultaneously. Rogers (2002) models the simultaneity of executive portfolio structure and hedging. Conducting tests for endogeneity (e.g., Kennedy (1992) ) of hedging in the value regression (and vice versa), we find no support for a simultaneous system of equations involving value and hedging.
22 Fazzari et al. (1988) model investment as a function of cash flow and Q to estimate investment-cash flow sensitivity.
obtain the total hedging premium, we then add the coefficient on the hedging variable in the second-stage Q estimation.
As may be seen in Models 1 through 3, the effect of hedging on value through both its direct effect and its effect on capital expenditures is ambiguous. One point worth noting is that statistical significance of the coefficients on the hedging variables is non-existent. We do not debate this point; rather we focus on the economic significance of the coefficients in comparing those to results from the one-stage estimations discussed earlier. On one hand, the total hedging premiums estimated by Models 1 and 2 are similar to those shown in Table 5 . In fact, the economic magnitude of the premium appears larger in the two-stage systems relative to the onestage systems modeled in imply that more than 100 percent of the hedging premium comes from its effect on capital expenditures.
VI. Conclusion
The US airline industry offers a unique sample allowing for a more direct test of the value implications of hedging predicted by Froot et al. (1993) . High jet fuel prices coincide with low industry cash flows, and industry investment is positively related to the level of jet fuel costs. Because jet fuel constitutes a large percentage of airline operating costs and jet fuel prices are highly volatile, airlines face an incentive to hedge fuel price risk. Such hedging provides firms with the opportunity to buy underpriced assets from distressed airlines during periods of high jet fuel prices and/or protects the ability to meet previously contracted purchase commitments.
We find that airlines employing jet fuel hedging trade at a premium, after controlling for other factors impacting value. This result provides evidence in support of Allayannis and Weston's (2001) findings that hedging adds value. While Guay and Kothari (2003) One caveat of our results is necessary. If jet fuel hedging is a valuable activity, then why don't all airlines engage in this practice? In other words, do non-hedgers act suboptimally? The answer is probably not. The hedging premiums discussed reflect the average net benefit of fuel hedging. In the framework developed in this paper, many smaller airlines may find that additional cash flows provided by hedging are too small to allow for acquisitions or asset purchases at discount prices. Additionally, issues of financial strength and creditworthiness may be a factor in some non-hedging decisions. The costs of hedging may be prohibitive for firms with poor credit quality (i.e., such firms may not be able to find a willing counterparty). Firms lacking adequate liquidity may also be unable to afford option premiums or cash margin on futures contracts.
Appendix A Example Disclosures Illustrating Fuel Price Risk for Airlines
This appendix provides examples of fuel price risk disclosures for airlines that do not hedge (see Panel A), use fuel derivatives (see Panel B) and use fuel pass-through agreements (see Panel C) . The information is collected from the 10-K reports of airlines and illustrates how exposure to jet fuel prices varies by firm based on the firm's hedging mechanisms.
Panel A: Example Disclosures From Airlines that Does Not Hedge using Fuel Derivatives
From Vanguard Airlines' 1999 10K Report Jet fuel costs are subject to wide fluctuations as a result of disruptions in supply or other international events. The Company cannot predict the effect on the future availability and cost of jet fuel. The Boeing 737-200 jet aircraft is relatively fuel inefficient compared to newer aircraft. Accordingly, a significant increase in the price of jet fuel results in a disproportionately higher increase in the Company's fuel expenses as compared with many of its competitors who have, on average, newer and thus more fuelefficient aircraft. The Company has not entered into any agreements that fix the price of jet fuel over any period of time. Therefore, an increase in the cost of jet fuel will be immediately passed through to the Company by suppliers. The Company has experienced reduced margins when the Company has been unable to increase fares to compensate for such higher fuel costs. Even at times when the Company is able to raise selected fares, the Company has experienced reduced margins on sales prior to such fare increases.
From Airtran/ValueJet's 1999 10K Report
The cost of jet fuel is an important expense for The Company. The Company estimates that a one-cent increase in fuel cost would increase the Company's fuel expenses by approximately $57,000 per month, based on the Company's current fuel consumption rate. Jet fuel costs are subject to wide fluctuations as a result of sudden disruptions in supply, such as the effect of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. Due to the effect of world and economic events on the price and availability of oil, the future availability and cost of jet fuel cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. Increases in fuel prices or a shortage of supply could have a material adverse effect on the Company's operations and operating results. The Company has not entered into any agreement which fixes the price or guarantees delivery of fuel over any period of time. A significant increase in the price of jet fuel would result in a disproportionately higher increase in the Company's average total costs than its competitors using more fuel efficient aircraft and whose fuel costs represent a smaller portion of total costs. 
Panel B: Example Disclosures From Airlines that Use Fuel Derivatives
From United Airlines 1999 10K Report
Changes in fuel prices are industry-wide occurrences that benefit or harm United's competitors as well as United, although fuel-hedging activities may affect the degree to which fuel-price changes affect individual companies…. The impact of rising fuel costs is somewhat tempered by United's fuel hedging program. United pursues an options based strategy in which the upside is retained while the downside is eliminated. At the end of 1999, 75% of United's fuel exposure was hedged, but the goal is for fuel exposure in 2000 to be 100% hedged by the end of the first quarter.
Panel C: Example Disclosures From Airlines using Fuel Pass-Through Agreements From Mesa Air Group's 1999 10K Report
The Company has exposure to certain market risks associated with its aircraft fuel. Aviation fuel expense is a significant expense for any air carrier and even marginal changes greatly impact a carriers profitability. Standard industry contracts do not generally provide protection against fuel price increases, nor do they insure availability of supply. However, both the USAirways and America West fee for departure contracts allow fuel costs to be passed directly back to the codeshare partner, thereby reducing the overall exposure of Mesa to fuel price fluctuations. In the fourth quarter of fiscal 1999, 62.2% of Mesa fuel requirements were associated with these contracts. A substantial increase in the price of jet fuel or the lack of adequate fuel supplies in the future would have a material adverse effect on Mesa's business, financial condition, and the results of operations and liquidity.
From Skywest, Inc.'s 1999 10K Report
The Company is exposed to fluctuations in the price and availability of aircraft fuel that affect the Company's earnings. Currently, the Company has limited its exposure to fuel price increases with respect to approximately 65 percent of available seat miles produced, due to contractual arrangements with Delta and United. These major airlines reimburse the Company for the actual cost of fuel on contracted flights.
From World Airways 1995 10K Report
Fluctuations in the price of fuel has not had a significant impact on the Company's operations in recent years. The Company's exposure to fuel risk is limited because (i) under the terms of the Company's basic contracts, the customer is responsible for providing fuel, (ii) under the terms of its full service contracts with the U.S. Government, the Company is reimbursed for the cost of fuel it provides, and (iii) under the Company's charter contracts, the Company is reimbursed for fuel price increases in excess of 5% of the price agreed upon in the contract, subject to a 10% cap. Table 1 shows annual figures of industry jet fuel costs, cash flow (defined as net income plus depreciation as a percentage of asset book value) and capital expenditures (as a percentage of asset book value) in the first three columns. The next three columns show cross-sectional averages, medians, and standard deviations of individual airline capital expenditure percentages for each year. The difference between "industry" and "average" capital expenditures is that the "industry" figure is the ratio of the sums (across firms) of capital expenditures and assets, while "average" is a simple average of the ratio of capital expenditures divided by assets. The number of observations utilized for the summary statistics is shown in the final column. -Natl & Regional (1994 1.1854 1.0834 Median -Natl & Regional (1994 0.8639 0.9439 Std Dev -Natl & Regional (1994 0 Table 5 Estimates of the Relationship Between Firm Value and Hedging Behavior by Airlines Models 1 through 3 are estimated using pooled OLS with robust standard errors, while models 4 through 6 are estimated using GLS with a heteroskedastically consistent covariance matrix. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q. All regressions include year dummy variables indicating 1996-2000. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors for the pooled OLS regressions and are shown in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. Z-statistics are shown in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates for the GLS regressions. Statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Table 7 shows the results of regressions comparable to models 3 and 6 from Table 7 . In both specifications, a variable has been added that is the product of the capital expenditures and hedging variables. The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q. Year dummy variables indicating 1996-2000 are included in both regressions. T-statistics (z-statistics for the GLS estimates) are shown in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. Statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. 
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